Monetary Union, EU financial transfers and regional integration: The Spanish case by Jose Maria Mella & Maria Asuncion Lopez
 
1
MONETARY UNION, EU FINANCIAL TRANSFERS AND REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: THE SPANISH CASE
JOSE MARIA MELLA MARQUEZ
* 
UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA OF MADRID  
SPAIN   
                                                
*
 I thank my colleagues Alejandro Lorca and Antonio Fernández for their comments. Althought everything written here is my own responsability. 
2
INTRODUCTION
  According to the best established economic theories, the monetary union does not
spontaneously guarantee a catching-up process among the member states in terms of well-being
economic level. On the contrary, the monetary unification can increase the income disparities
among countries and regions, if they are not strong compensation policies which help the least
developed territorial economies to make an effort of a more intense investment in order to
achieve greater production growth rates.
Our attention will be on three points. In the first place, we are going to analyse the
cohesion problem in the EU. Secondly, we are going to survey some inconsistences of the EU
budget. And, finally, we are going to make some reflections of economic and regional policy
taking into account the enlargement of the  EU to the east and central european countries in the
next future.
A MAIN TARGET: COHESION
The consecutives adhesions to the EU of the less-developed countries and the new
challenges derived from the accomplishment of the single market and the evolution toward the
Economic and Monetary Union have been the main factors that have promoted the target of a
greater economic and social cohesion. And as a result, the EU has been establishing and 
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reinforcing active or voluntary policies to face this target -as they are reflected in the Single
European Act and in the Maastrich Treaty.
In other words, the evidence during the last 20 years of the european history is that there
is a direct relationship between the progressive enlargement to the periphery of the EU, the
deepening of the single market and the achievement of the monetary union, from one side, and
the strengthening of the Structural and Cohesion Funds, from the other side.
So, as a previous matter, it seems convenient to define what do we understand by
economic and social cohesion. In fact, cohesion is the catching-up or approach process of the
less-developed countries to the developed countries in terms of income and economic well-
being. It’s the so-called "real convergence".
But, in order to achieve the "real convergence", the "nominal convergence" or
macroeconomic stability represents a necessary condition, althought no suficient. Even more,
both targets -real and nominal convergence, or life level and money stability- can be in
contradiction, if the measures adopted to comply the macroeconomic stability prevent the
economic growth of the less-developed countries (Mella, 1993; Martin, 1997).
This risk could be very real, because of the celerity of the economic actions to attain the
fiscal stability established in the Treaty of the Union. 
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Concerning this risk or problem, we must take into account that -according to the new
economic theories of the endogene growth- the infrastructures, the human and technological
capital, and other intangible assets require the support of the public investment and the EU
budget.
This support is particularly important in countries like Spain, where the relative
productivity level and tha GDP per head are still far below the european average.
As Figure 1 shows, the relative gap of divergence between Spain and the European
Union is still in 1996 of 23.4%, according to the EUROSTAT  statistical data. Nevertheless, the
spanish adhesion to EC in 1986 - allowed its economy to advance 6.8 percentage points in this
last period (1985-1996). This approaching is mainly the result of higher GDP growth per head in
Spain during the economic expansion of the eigthies particularly in the second half.
In a long term point of view, the Figure 1 also shows that there is a common feature -at
least since the beginning of the international opening of Spain in 1960- of the spanish economy
along the last decades: the correlation between the economic expansion periods (recession) and
the convergence (divergence) of its GDP per capita in relation to the EU countries (Fuentes
1995). Then, Spain needs to take good advantage of the current european economic recovery to
reduce the standard of living gap with the EU. 
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FIGURA 1
In order to get a complete vision of the real level of convergence of Spain, it should be
convenient to take into account other important variables like the unemployment rate and other
strategic factors of the long term growth: the technology and the human capital (Martin, 1997).
The Spanish unemployment rate is about 22% of the active population, approximately
twice the European unemployment rate (11%). Therefore, there is a very important Spanish
potential population, that could be employed and incorporated to the economic activity. Some
estimations conclude that (Alcaide, 1997) -under the hypothesis of an unemployment rate
equivalent to the European average and the productivity of this potential population was similar
to the occupied workers -the convergence index would raise to the 91%. The causes of this poor
performance of the Spanish economy are the higher rates of the labor cost in comparison with





















































the evolution of the labor productivity, the rigidities of the labor market (especially, the hard
legislation about the layoff that makes very expensive the dismissals and -as a consequence- the
high segmentation between the permanent and the temporary workers, that are somehow being
changed by recent regulations), and serious difficulties of the productive and technological
system to take advantage of the technical innovations (Mella and Lorca, 1996; Martín, 1997).
The Spanish level in terms of technological capital stock -or accumulated R+D
investment-, despite the reduction of the difference with the EU (13 percentual  points during the
period 1986-1996), is only the 34% of the EU average in 1996, pointing out in a very strong way
the long path that still remains to run for our economy. For instance, according to EUROSTAT,
the Spanish R+D expenditures were in 1991 0.87% of the GDP while the EU was expending
2.01%, being more than one half of the expenses financed by the public sector.
The Spanish level in terms of human capital -or proportion of the potential active
population (15 to 65  years old) with an education equivalent to the university level in relation to
the EU average- has seen a reduction of 6 percentage points from 58% (1986) to 64% (1996).
If we analyse the cohesion from the regional panorama, we can notice very clearly that
the territorial disparities among the european regions (Table 1) are very high (even spectacular)
in terms of GDP per head, productivity and unemployment. The comparison of the 25 better
regions and the 25 worst regions throws a strong evidence: the richest regions have a GDP per
capita and a productivity 2.5 and 2.1 times the poorest ones, while the unemployment rate is 
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only one fith. Moreover, the regional disparities have not improved (during the period 1983-
1993) according to the GDP per head and the productivity (GDP per employee), but the
unemployment has worsened very much (the ratio between the highest rate and the lowest was
3.6 in 1983 and 4.9 in 1993).
The ranking of the Spanish regions in the European context (table 2) allows to
say that the cohesion or real convergence problem is really severe for regions as Extremadura
(order 194, there are 203 regions in the EU, and 54% of the GDP per head), Andalucía (order
191 and 57% of GDP per head), Galicia (order 186 and 59% of GDP per head) and some others,
which are placed in the last positions of the table and the GDP per capita is hardly one fourth of
the first regions of the EU. It does not mean that we can mention regions -as Canarias and
Comunidad Valenciana, for instance- than have been working and evolving quite well, and can
leave their current status of objective 1 regions. But, actually, Spain as a whole, has a very
serious cohesion problem because its richest regions (Baleares, Madrid and Cataluña) have only
more or less fifty- percent of the GDP per head of the richest regions of the EU (the germans
Hamburg and Darmstadt, and the European capital Brussels). 
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TABLA 1
REGIONAL DISPARITIES OF GDP, PRODUCTIVITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN









 REGIONS 1983 1993 1983 1993 1983 1993
AMONG THE MEMBERS STATES
The Best 134.8 160.1 124.2 124.3 3.3 2.3
The worst 55.1 63.2 51.3 58.6 17.4 22.3
Best/worst (a) 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.1 5.3 9.7
Standard Deviation 17.2 12.8 13.5 14.4 3.1 4.6
(Gini Coefficient) (0.89) (0.059)
AMONG THE REGIONS
The Best 184.0 189.0 398.0 420.4 1.7 3.2
The worst 39.0 37.0 32.1 36.6 22.5 33.3
Best/worst (a) 5.0 4.5 12.4 11.5 13.2 9.0
Best 10 154.0 158.0 146.0 156.0 3.8 3.9
Worst 10 44.0 48.0 49.4 48.6 19.4 26.4
10 Best/worst (a) 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.2 5.1 6.8
Best 25 140.0 142.0 131.3 130.7 4.8 4.6
Worst 25 53.0 55.0 63.3 63.1 17.2 22.4
25 Best/Worst (a) 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 3.6 4.9
Standard Deviation 26.8 27.2 18.0 17.6 4.2 6.0
(Gini Coefficient) (0.149) (0.153)
(a) In the case of the unemployment, higher rate of unemployment / lower rate of unemployment.
SOURCE: European Commission (1997), First Report on the economic and social cohesion 1996, Brussels.
Furthermore, the little regional variations by level and rank during the last period (table 2)
underline that the real convergence process is quite slow, which represents the long term nature
of the cohesion problem and demands a sustained effort from the private and public agents. 
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TABLE 2
RANKING OF THE SPANISH REGIONS IN THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL
CONTEXT (1988-1994)
(GDP per head in PPS, EUR 15 = 100
EU LEVEL = 100 RANK VARIATION
REGIONS 1994 1988 1994 1988 1994 1988
HAMBURG 196 - 1 - - -
BRUXELLES 183 - 2 - - -
DARMSTADT 178 - 3 - - -
BALEARES 98 100 79 68 -2 -11
MADRID 95 88 87 107 +7 +20
CATALUÑA 93 86 95 118 +7 +23
NAVARRA 91 93 100 93 -2 -7
PAIS VASCO 91 95 103 83 -4 -20
LA RIOJA 87 88 119 110 -1 -9
ARAGÓN 85 81 128 132 +4 +4
CANARIAS 75 73 149 151 +2 +2
CANTABRIA 75 80 150 138 -5 -12
C.VALENCIANA 73 61 153 166 +12 +13
ASTURIAS 72 81 158 135 -9 -23
CAST-LEON 71 66 159 159 +5 0
MURCIA 68 66 164 160 +2 -4
CEUTAY MELILLA 68 64 165 162 +4 -3
CAST-LA MANCHA 64 59 169 167 +5 -2
GALICIA 59 56 174 172 +3 -2
ANDALUCÍA 57 53 177 178 +4 +1
EXTREMADURA 54 - - - - -
SOURCE: EUROSTAT (1997), Brief Statistiques. Regions, Brussels.
EU BUDGET: SOME INCONSISTENCES
A public budget has three main functions: to stabilize, to assign and to distribute
(Tamames, 1996). The comparison of the Union budget with the public expenses and the gross 
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national product (GNP) of the member states shows -during the decade 1986/96- its reduced size
(1,24% of the EU GDP), the small increase during this last period, the scarce possibilities of
raise in the next future included in the current financial perspectives, and the impossibility of
becoming indebted to cover expenses. Consequently, the Union budget cannot be used as a tool
of economic stabilization.
In addition, the assign function of the budget is made by means of regulations
more than by provision of public goods. Finally, the expenses distribution -although limited due
to the reduced amount of the budget- is the most important and centralized function, from the
geografical point of view.
In this sense, it is noteworthy the growing contrast between the fast unification of
the monetary policy (in the European Central Bank) and the high degree of descentralization of
the fiscal policy (in the outstanding relevance of the national budgets).
Recently, many studies support the idea of a greater fiscal autonomy for the
European Union in order to face the probable assymetric shocks under the Economic and
Monetary Union as a consequence of the different productive structures of the european
countries. The reasons are the stabilization necessity of the assimetric shocks, the greater
discipline concerning the public deficit and the improvement of the assign and distributive
efficience. Even though, it is evident that the recent Stability Agreement (June 1997) limits
rigorously the action margin of the states members. 
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The Community’s budget has been changing, during the recent past, its
expenditure structure. Firstly, the main change has been the diminution of the CAP expenses
and, futhermore, the current guideline ceiling or limit to 74% of the EU GNP growth has to be
maintened in the future. This decision prevents, to a certain extent, the protective character of the
CAP, reduces the financial cost and inefficiences, develops a market oriented strategy of this
policy and eventually allows a greater endowment of the Structural Funds. Even though the CAP
keeps representing the most important part of the EU budget (almost fifty percent of the total
expenditure).
Secondly, the Strutural Funds have been increasing. This increase has been very
intensive during the deepening of the european integration process and, particularly, just in the
moment of the Community enlargement.
Let us remember the reform and duplication of the Structural Funds with the
Single Market set up in the Single Act and the creation of the Cohesion Fund in the Union
Treaty of Maastrich. The adhesion of Spain and Portugal increased later the amount of these
funds, provoked the Integrated Mediterranean Programs as a compensation to Grece, France and
Italy by the agricultural competence of the new members and the last comers Sweeden, Finland
and Austrich, required the sixth objetif for the development of the regions with low population
density. These facts show that the European Commission is sensitive and aware of the 
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importance of the economic and social cohesion, as well as the need of mitigating the potencial
negative effects of the common market on the less developed regions.
The item of research and technological development -the so-called Framework
Programs-, mainly targeted to promote the R+D  activities and reduce the technological gap
among Europe and Japan and the United States, has experienced very little increasing,
contributing hardly to improve the competitiveness of the european companies in the global
market and to bring down the european unemployment rate.
In terms of budget revenue, it’s important to say that, in spite of the successive
reforms, there is still some inequitable treatment among the different countries. The revenue
structure has registered a deep transformation, as a result of the reduction of the agricultural
levies, the customs duties ant the VAT, and the raising of the fourth resource GNP (Fernández,
1997).
The VAT is a consumption tax and as result it has a regresive role, penalizing the
less prosperous countries that have a higher relative rate of comsumption.
The fourth resource establishes an uniform rate applied on the GNP of each
country, without taking into acount their income level or contribution capacity. Actually, the
least developped countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) contribute -in terms of GNP per
capita- significativily more than the developed countries to the european budget. In addition, the 
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poorer countries must contribute to the UK abatement, being Spain one of the most important
relative contributors.
Also, let us comment some aspects related with the fiscal competition among
state members, which could be negative in terms of economic and social cohesion (Sinn, 1993).
The competition among countries to attract capital and high skilled workers could lead to an
average tax rate lower throughout the Union, higher expenses of the more mobile production
factors (capital, big companies and high income professionals) and increasing pressures to raise
the taxes over the less mobile production factors (land, small and middle companies and
unskilled workers).
So, paradoxically, it could happen that the less mobile factors would subsidize
the more mobile factores, the poor countries transfer income to the rich countries, unless the EU
decides to harmonize the income and capital taxes and limits the fiscal subsidiarity principle.
In other words, that means that the EU needs not only less subsidiarity, but also a
bigger federal budget folowing the experience of countries like United States, Canada and
Australia. A more centralized budget charges a heavier weight to the more prosperous
states/regions, while the social expenses benefit the less prosperous states/regions. And a bigger
budget helps to the states/regions under economic crisis or affected by the so-called asymmetric
shocks. 
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The EU budget will have to be adapted in the future more deeply -following the
guidelines already started in the right direction- in order to correct the forementioned
inconsistences bearing in mind the negative potential effects of the Monetary Union on the less
development regions, the requirement of cohesion of the least developed regions,  and eventually
the enlargement toward the eastern european countries.
An accurate appraisal of the impact of the funds on the regional disparities
reduction shows that the accumulated total amount for Spain -during the period 1994-1999-
only represents 1.3% of the GDP, which does not seem strong enough to create a “big push” on
our peripherial economies. Besides it has to be said that not only the amount of the funds are
insufficient to the explicited target, but also its structure and territorial distribution among
countries.
In fact, the table 3 shows that the four least developed countries (Greece,
Portugal, Spain and Ireland) absorve 23.6% of the CAP funds, while the structural and cohesion
funds represents  55.4% and as a consequence the accumulated total payments only are the
36.5%. So, it means that the richest countries as Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands and
France are been very much benefited by the application of the CAP, receiving 52.8% of this
agricultural fund via prices and market regulations. Futhermore, during the period 1994-1999,
Spain is receiving on average 893 ecus per person, while Ireland, Portugal and Greece are
receiving 1,604, 1,417 and 1,369 ecus per person respectively, and Germany and Italy 534 ecus
per person, when on average the EU as a whole receives 628 ecus per   TABLA 3
ACCUMULATED POPULATION AND EU FINANTIAL TRANSFERS ORDERED BY GDP PER HEAD (1994-1999)
COUNTRIES GDP IN ECU PER
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GREECE 66 2.8 7.4 11.8 17,736 1,369 9.1
PORTUGAL 67 5.5 8.5 23.4 17,642 1,417 14.6
SPAIN 77 16.0 18.7 50.5 42,399 893 31.6
IRELAND 93 17.0 23.6 55.4 7,405 1,604 36.5
FINLAND 96 18.4 - - 1,654 301 -
UNITED KINGDOM 96 34.1 31.0 61.9 11,734 1.573 43.6
SWEDEN 101 36.5 - - 1,304 248 -
ITALY 103 51.9 47.2 75.4 21,649 534 58.7
NETHERLANDS 107 56.1 56.1 76.8 2,616 263 64.5
FRANCE 107 71.8 77.2 84.9 14,939 305 80.3
GERMANY 110 93.7 92.3 98.2 21,730 534 94.6
BELGIUM 112 96.4 96.1 99.4 2,096 367 97.4
ASTRIA 112 98.5 - - 1,576 210 -
DENMARK 116 99.9 99.9 99.8 843 216 99.9
LUXEMBURG 169 100 100 100 102 131 100
EU 15 100 167,709
1 628
1 This amount includes the so-called community initiatives
2  These total payments include the FEOGA-G and other policies (excluded the Structural Funds).
SOURCE: EUROSTAT EC (1997), First Report of the Cohesion Fund, and own calculations.17
person. These figures are not proportional at all, according to the relative depth of the regional
problem of the forementioned countries and then they would be corrected in order to obtain the
strongest effect of the structural and cohesion interventions.
On the other hand, table 4 permits to observe the regional distribution of the
structural and cohesion funds in Spain since the spanish adhesion to the EC.
TABLE 4








CASTILLA Y LEON 9.29 142
GALICIA 9.07 128
C. VALENCIANA 7.90 80
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 7.36 172












CEUTA Y MELILLA 0.49 150
LA RIOJA 0.33 49
SPAIN 100 100
SOURCE: Adapted and taken from CORDERO (1997)18
It clearly shows an evident spatial eligibility, channeling the most part of the
funds to the objective 1 regions. The least developed  regions or regions below 75% of the EU
GDP average (see Table 2). This is the case of Extremadura which receives 191 ecus per head
(almost twice the amount received by the spanish economy), Castilla - La Mancha (172 ecus per
head), Asturias (153 ecus per head), Ceuta y Melilla (150 ecus per head), Castilla y León (142
ecus per head), Canarias (133 ecus per head), Galicia (128 ecus per head) and Andalucía (125
ecus per head). These less developed regions get much more -according with the concentration
guideline of the structural funds- that the more developed regions like Madrid (32 ecus per
head), Baleares (37 ecus per head), Cataluña (43 ecus per head), La Rioja (49 ecus per head) and
Navarra (63 ecus per head).
In other words, spanish authorities have been very careful in the regional
application of the structural and cohesion funds, taking into account the GDP per head criteria as
a high priority..
It is very difficult to evaluate the regional impact of these interventions. But we
can say that the overall impact on the spanish economy, according to some estimations (Herce,
1995), was during the period 1989-1993 of more 400.000 created jobs or the same number of no
job loss. Similar estimates or simulations for the period 1994-1999 present an impact of the
4.3% on the GDP, 1.8% on the employment, a reduction of the 0.27% of the public deficit and19
also a diminution of the 1.32% of the trade deficit (both in terms of percent of the GDP). The
main impact in the middle term is the improvement of the private inputs productivity due to the
accumulation of infrastructures, human capital and aids to the companies.
In short, the EU has good reasons to carry out such reform initiative. Firstly, the
Structural Funds are contributing more and more to the cohesion objetive, but the payments
related to other policies like CAP, internal policies as environment and R+D, are weakening the
impact of the Structural Funds to the real convergence. Secondly, the cohesion funds received by
the least developed countries do not represent strongs percents of the GNP of the countries and
they are much lesser for Spain than for Ireland and no much bigger than for Germany and Italy. 
Therefore, Spain is of course the main recipient country in absolute terms, but its position does
not play a leader first beneficiary member state. Thirdly, the structural and cohesion funds have
been distribuiting in a concentrated way to reinforce the internal convergence. And fourthly, the
economic impact of those funds are not negliable at all in terms of production, employment and
macroeconomic balances.
SOME REFLECTIONS
Economists are professionals that discover logic inconsistences in the economic
policies, but fortunately they are not responsible of their execution. On the contrary, politicians
do not need to be so keen in their analysis, but they are obliged of an adequate application of20
their decisions. Therefore, priorities and the timing of the execution of the different policies are
chosen or should be chosen by the politicians, according to an appropiate consensus and the
support of the public opinion.
From one hand, according to some studies (Beutel, 1996), the Structural Funds
and the Cohesion Fund impacts are being very favorable not only for the income and the
employment of the less developed regions, but also for their strengthening of productive capacity
by means of the improvement of the infrastructures, the skills of the labour resources and
eventually a stronger regional competitivity.
On the other hand, the integration in the Monetary Union and the compliance of
the Stability Agreement are requiring and will require an strict monetary and budgetary policy, a
severe control of the inflation rate, the déficit and the public debt and the impossibility of the
competitives devaluations as an instrument of foreign economic policy.
It is clear that bearing in mind the possitive effects of the Structural Funds and
the mentioned macroeconomic conditions and bearing in mind also that the territorial
inequalities will persist in the middle term among the states and regions of the EU, a stronger
cohesion target and a pertinent adequation of the budget and de comunnity's policies not only
should they be kept but also reinforced.21
Nevertheless, the uncertainties concerning the accomplishment of the Monetary
Union process, the repercussions of this process in the Union budget and in the different
community’s policies, and the implications of the future enlargement to the eastern countries,
will have no negligable effects on the structural Funds and on the CAP.
Futhermore, the "2000 Agenda" of the EC proposes for the 2000-2006 period
(Table 5) a budget ceiling (1.27% of the Union GNP for the same foreseen level of the year
1999), a very definite percent (0.46% of the Union GNP, 275.000 millions of 1997 ecus) for the
Structural and Cohesion Fund, the financial support for the preadhesion and the cohesion for the
new eastern members (45.000 Mecus of the 275.000 Mecus, aproximately a 20% of the total
amount) and the current state members will obtain 230.000 Mecus (210.000 for the Structural
Funds and 20.000 for Cohesion Fund) and the global amount for them will nearly diminish a 5%
as result of the enlargement (Table 6).
TABLE 5
GENERAL NEW FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 2000-2006 (Prices 1997)
BILLIONS OF ECUS CREDITS
FOR COMPRO- MISES 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
AGRICULTURE 43.3 44.1 45.0 46.1 47.0 48.0 49.0 50.0
STRUCTURAL ACTIONS 36.1 35.2 36.0 338.8 39.8 40.7 41.7 42.8
INTERNAL POLICIES 6.1 6.1 6.4 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.1
FOREIGN ACTIONS 6.6 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.6
ADMINISTRATION 4.5 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
RESERVES 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
CREDITS FOR
COMPROMISES
97.8 97.5 99.8 105.1 107.1 109.5 112.0 114.522
TOTAL CREDIT.
FOR PAYMENTS
92.5 94.1 96.6 101.1 103.9 106.5 108.9 111.4
Credits for payments (% of GDP) 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.22 1.22 11.22 1.22 1.22
Margin 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Maximun limit of the own resources 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27
TABLE 6
EVOLUTION OF THE STRUCURAL  ACTION EXPENSES (Prices 1997)
BILLIONS OF ECUS 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EU 15
STRUCTURAL FUNDS 31.4 31.3 32.1 31.3 30.3 29.2 28.2 27.3
COHESION FUNDS 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
MEMBER STATES* 0.0 0.0 3.6 5.6 7.6 9.6 11.6
PREVIOS AID TO THE ADHESION 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
TOTAL 34.3 35.2 36.0 38.8 39.8 40.7 41.7 42.8
* Included the participation of the Cohesion Fund.
SOURCE: EC, Agenda 2000.
In a context of budget ceiling, the only way to keep or even to increase the
cohesion effort would be the reduction of the correspondent amount of the other common
policies (for instance, the CAP, which benefit very particularly the North Europe). But this one
is not the case, if we compare the financial perspectives of the agricultural expenditures (Table
5) and the structural funds (Table 6). So, the financial cost of the enlargement basically falls on
the cohesion resources of the current fifteen state members and very especially on the net
recipient countries of the South Europe.
Even more, as the 2000 Agenda warns, the enlargement to the eastern countries
will provoke a steep reduction of the community’s average GNP per capita (much higher that in 
 previous enlargements).23
To bring to mind that the GNP per capita of the eastern countries is hardly 32%
of the community’s average, leaving far behind the less developed countries of the fifteen Union
which level is around 74%. Therefore, the current criteria to be benefited for the Structural Fund
(GNP per head below 75% of the community’s average) and for the Cohesion Fund (GNP per
head below 90% of the Community’s average) imply a revision of the current elegible regions
and state members. Obviously, this new situation will create a natural uneasiness and uncertainty
in the objective 1 regions and other regions with economic adaptation problems that require a
very careful design and execution of the economic and regional policy.
In conclusion, the brilliant trajectory of the EU, the political capacity of the
European Commission and the wise negotiations which would take place among state members
would be able of increasing corrections of some inconsistences of the EU budget, to elaborate
new adequate gidelines for the structural funds working and to enhance the economic and social
cohesion of the new Europe at the beginning of the new century.24
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